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This paper focuses on the international community’s response to the 
increased perceived threat of terrorism since 9/11 and how the so-called “war 
on terror” has affected our understanding of what constitutes terrorism. It 
briefly details some of the major legislative changes that have been enacted 
and examines the impact of counter-terror strategies on certain unresolved 
legal issues that have historically dogged the international community’s 
efforts to arrive at an internationally agreed definition of terror. This includes 
the relationship between terrorism and the right to self-determination, the 
emerging right to democracy, and the existence of a license to use force as a 
last resort against an oppressive regime. The paper explores how the failure to 
resolve the relationship between these international legal principles has 
seriously undermined the efficacy of certain proscription regimes adopted 
around the world. It examines whether proscription regimes are in danger of 
disproportionately interfering with certain fundamental freedoms thereby 
reducing the scope for conflict resolution between aggrieved parties engaged 




Over the last six years the international community has witnessed a 
massive increase in both international and domestic legislation concerning 
terrorism. The catalyst for much of this legislation was of course the tragic 
events of 9/11 although the process of proscribing so-called terror movements 
was gathering pace before the attacks by Al Qaeda. 
The engine powering this recent legislative onslaught is Security Council 
Resolution 1373 passed of 28 September 2001.1 This Resolution imposed 
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1 Press Release SC/7158 – Security Council unanimously adopts wide – ranging anti- 
terrorism resolution calls for suppressing financing, improving international 
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extensive obligations on States to prevent and counter terrorism and 
established a Committee of the Security Council to monitor its 
implementation. Significantly, the Resolution required States to ensure that 
“terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws 
and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such 
terrorist acts,”2 irrespective of whether such acts are caught by ordinary 
existing criminal provisions. Resolution 1373 not only reflected the 
worldwide revulsion felt about the attack on the twin towers in New York, it 
also catapulted the issue of terrorism onto the international agenda in a way 
not seen before.  
Just eight days earlier, on 20 September 2001 President Bush set the tone 
when he declared: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From 
this day forward, any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism 
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”3 This declaration 
had a huge impact on state practice towards countering terrorism. Hitherto the 
lack of any internationally agreed definition of terrorism was legally 
inconsequential as no international rights or duties hinged on the term 
“terrorism”. All previous international conventions on terrorism were act 
specific and did not generically define who was a terrorist and who was not. 
However, President Bush’s clarion call changed all of that for good. It 
effectively required numerous States to define its position in relation to 
numerous dissident groups and armed struggles around the world by 
pressuring states to adopt various proscription regimes. 
The question today is how has President Bush’s so-called “war on terror”, 
together with the counter measures adopted by various states pursuant to 
Resolution 1373, affected the debate about what constitutes terrorism? Are we 
any forward in achieving an international consensus about what constitutes 
and what does not constitute terrorism? For example, what is the current 
status of the right to self-determination and other fundamental freedoms 
protected by international law in relation to the global fight against terrorism? 
How has the recent swathe of domestic state anti-terror legislation affected the 
status of any evolving right to democracy or to resist state oppression through 
violence as a last resort? What is the legal status of State sponsored terrorism? 
The answers to these questions will have profound consequences for the 
global fight against terrorism in the future.  
 
cooperation resolution 1373 (2001) also creates committee to monitor implementation 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm  
2 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 2 (e). 
3 “Freedom at War with Fear” – Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People – http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
8.html 
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THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM 
 
What is perhaps most revealing about this global fight is that despite the 
plethora of domestic anti-terror legislation passed by member states since 
Resolution 1373 the international community is still nowhere further in 
agreeing a definition of “terrorism”. But whereas beforehand the consequence 
of failing to agree a definition of terrorism was largely academic today it has 
profound consequences legal, social and political consequences. 
The inability to define terror has dogged the international community for 
60 years. According to Kalliopi K Koufa, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Terrorism and Human Rights, 109 definitions were put forward between 1936 
and 1981.4 However, none were universally acceptable. The 1972 ad hoc 
committee of the UN General Assembly singularly failed to agree a Draft 
Comprehensive Convention or a definition of terrorism due to divisions over 
the status of national liberation movements. The 1996 ad hoc which was 
established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 51/210 attempted to 
build on a non-binding definition of the Assembly contained in its 1994 
“Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism”5 but to also 
little effect. This failure to agree a comprehensive definition has led instead to 
the development of specific international conventions dealing with specific 
acts of terror. Thus, since 1963 there have been at least twelve international 
conventions dealing with aspects of “terrorism” yet none contain an 
internationally agreed definition. Even the most recent 1999 UN International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings6 fails to define 
“terrorism.” 
As noted above, such lack of clarity has continued even after 9/11. Both 
UN Security Council Resolutions 13687 and 13738 do not define “terrorism”. 
Although 1373 states that any act of international terrorism constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security and requires member states to combat 
terrorism by all means, it does not clarify what it means by the term “acts”. As 
Judge Gilbert Guillaume, former President of the ICJ, rightly observes: “the 
international community has not been able to reach an agreement on such a 
definition of terrorism.”9 Such failure has moved, Rosalyn Higgins, another 
Judge at the International Court of Justice, to comment that: “terrorism is a 
4 Working Paper K K Koufa 26 June 1997. 
5 General Assembly A/RES/51/210 – 17 December 1996 – 88th plenary meeting. 
51/210 measures to eliminate international terrorism recalling its resolution 49/60 of 
December 1994 – http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r210.htm. 
6 Adopted 9 December 1999. 
7 Adopted 12 September 2001. 
8 Adopted 28 September 2001. 
9 G Guillaume, “Terrorism and International Law” International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (2004), 53:537-548. 
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term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding 
to activities, which States or individuals widely disapproved of.”10 Yet, 
Rosalyn Higgins’ dictum is, with respect, out of date given the post 9/11 
“legislative environment”. The definition of terrorism may remain a term 
without legal significance in so far as its construction is uncertain from a 
strictly legal point of view, but there is nothing uncertain or legally 
insignificant about its consequences for those deemed to be caught by new 
state anti-terror legislation.  
In fact, the continued difficulty of formulating an objective definition of 
terrorism, and the resulting potential for arbitrary political decisions, was 
recently considered post 9/11 in the decision of Suresh v Canada (January 11, 
2002).11 The Supreme Court of Canada considered an argument that the term 
“terrorism” was so subjective in its meaning as to be “void for vagueness”.  
Although the Court rejected the challenge, it emphasised the risk of abuse 
where a legal definition depended on an essentially political judgment: 
 
“One searches in vain for an authoritative definition of 
“terrorism”…[T]here is no single definition that is accepted 
internationally.  The absence of an authoritative definition means that, 
at least at the margins, ‘the term is open to politicised manipulation, 
conjecture and polemical interpretation.’…Even amongst those who 
agree on the definition of the term, there is considerable disagreement 
as to whom the term should be attached…Perhaps the most striking 
example of the politicised nature of the term is that Nelson Mandela’s 
African National Congress was, during the apartheid era, routinely 
labelled a terrorist organisation, not only by the South African 
government but by much of the international community.”12
 
The Court considered that the essence of the term, as internationally 
understood, was reflected in Article 2(1)(b) of the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (UN General Assembly 
Resolution 54/109, 9 December 1999).  This defines terrorism as any “act 
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed 
conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate 
a population or to compel a government or an international organisation to do 
10 Professor Bill Bowring http://mujahedin-e-khalq.org/MEK-
MKO/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=29&Itemid=31 
11 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Ctizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 SC R 3, 2002 
SCC1. 
12 Para.94 – http://csc.lexum.unmontreal.ca/en/2002/2002scc1.html 
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or abstain from doing any act.”13  In the Court’s view, this definition “catches 
the essence of what the world understands by ‘terrorism’.” 
The Supreme Court naturally recognised that it was open to a national 
Parliament to adopt a different or more detailed definition for the purposes of 
domestic legislation.  However, it noted that the broader the definition 
becomes, the greater is the risk of arbitrary and “manipulated” application. 
The question is how much does it matter if individual states adopt a broader 
definition?  Is the failure to agree an internationally recognised definition 
really that important?   
 
THE DANGERS OF OUTSOURCING OF THE DEFINITION OF 
TERROR TO MEMBER STATES 
 
Many observers believe the failure to agree a definition since 9/11 has 
produced profoundly dangerous legal effects. This is because Security 
Council Resolution 1373 has effectively outsourced the definition of terrorism 
to member states to define “terrorism” domestically without limitation. The 
hackneyed phrase “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” has 
been replaced with the dictum “one state’s terrorist is another state’s freedom 
fighter.” Whether a person or group is terrorist in nature is no longer a matter 
of personal political opinion or of international debate but of national law as 
defined by the particular law of the state in which one resides.  
Since 2001 the UK, EU and the USA have enacted extensive terror 
legislation including new definitions of what constitutes “terrorism”.  Within 
two months of 9/11 the Bush Administration rushed through the USA Patriot 
Act.14 The UK enacted the Crime and Security Act 2001. While on 13 June 
2002 the EU adopted its own Framework Decision that required member 
states to take legislative steps to implement its terms. Since then Australia, 
Belarus, China, Egypt, India, Israel, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, 
Malaysia, Russia, Syria, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe have all followed suit. 
Much of this legislation is the proscription regimes introduced. Moreover, this 
legislative frenzy has been conducted within the context of the Bush 
Administration’s clarion call. This has led many states to proscribe groups 
that are an anathema to the United States as a matter of foreign policy.  This 
in turn has had a significant impact on the protection of fundamental freedoms 
and internationally recognised principles of international law such as the right 
to self-determination. 
For example the European Union’s attempt to establish a common legal 
definition of terrorism is also linked to an attempt to abolish extradition 
13 Article 2(1)(b) of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism. 
14 USA Patriot Act – March 9 2006 – http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/patriotact/ 
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between member states in favour of an expedited procedure. This mirrors the 
concerted effort on the part of a number of states over the last six years to 
eliminate the “political offences” exception in relation to “terrorism”, which 
due to the absence of an internationally agreed definition, is now defined by 
each state. This has been coupled with measures to exclude “terrorists” from 
asylum and refugee protection. It is therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly that 
many states have responded in a way that best suit their interests, and have 
shown little hesitation in defining terrorism widely and proscribing various 
organisations without recourse to the international recognised legal norms, 
including the principle of self-determination.  
 
THE EFFECT OF OUTSOURCING ON THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 
 
The right to self-determination is recognised under customary 
international law as jus cogens.  It is also recognised in common Article 1 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which provide: 
 
“All peoples have the right to self-determination.  By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.”15
 
It is unnecessary, for present purposes to summarise the emergence of the 
right to self-determination in international law.  It is sufficient to note that it is 
now accepted that peoples have a right to self-determination in three 
situations:  where they are under colonial domination; where they are subject 
to alien military occupation; and where they are a distinct racial group denied 
equal access to government (so-called “racist regimes”).  The rules of 
international law: 
 
(a) Forbid a state in such circumstances from taking military or other 
coercive action to suppress the lawful exercise of the right to self-
determination; 
 
(b) Recognise that peoples exercising the right to self-determination 
have, in the last resort, a licence to engage in armed conflict to 
protect themselves, and to prevent the violent suppression of the 
exercise of the right to self-determination by the oppressor state; 
 
15 United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Part 1 Article 1(1). 
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(c) Forbid third states from affording support to oppressive states so 
as to assist them in suppressing the exercise of the right to self-
determination. 
 
In Self-Determination of Peoples by Professor Antonio Cassese,16 former 
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
the position in international law is summarised as follows: 
 
“[I]t now seems well established that international law bans not only 
the use of military force by states for the purpose of denying self-
determination to a colonial or foreign or a racial group, but also other 
forms of forcible action designed to pursue the same goal.  The first 
case occurs when a state uses armed violence to maintain or enforce 
its denial of self-determination.  The second case is when a state 
wielding authority over a colonial people, besides failing to take all 
the necessary measures for enabling the people to exercise its rights to 
self-determination, also sets up institutional, coercive mechanisms 
designed to prevent the implementation of self-determination (or in 
the course of its military occupation of a foreign country establishes 
procedures and takes measures designed to thwart any attempt by the 
occupied people to exercise its right to self-determination; or 
alternatively sets up in its domestic legal system institutions which 
deny a racially discriminated group equal access to government).   
 
In both classes of cases the denial of self-determination has a twofold 
legal relevance under international law:  firstly, it constitutes a 
violation of international legal rules; secondly, as we shall shortly see, 
it legitimises the resort to military force by the organisation 
representing the oppressed people or group… 
 
The importance of these normative developments should not be 
underestimated:  the international community has gone so far in its 
protection of self-determination as to prohibit not only the use of 
military force by the oppressive state, but also what could be termed 
‘institutionalised violence’, namely all those measures, mechanisms, 
and devices destined to prevent peoples or racial groups from 
exercising their right to self-determination… 
 
The UN Charter neither authorises nor bans the use of force by 
dependent peoples (or rather, by liberation movements representative 
16 A Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press,1998). 
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of those peoples) for the realisation of external self-
determination…Although no legal right proper was thus bestowed on 
liberation movements to resort to force, gradually the view emerged 
among states that nevertheless resort to force by these movements was 
not in violation of the general ban on force that had meanwhile 
emerged in the world community…However, the attitude of the world 
community was qualified by a basic condition:  that resort to force by 
liberation movements should only be effected as a response to the 
forcible denial of self-determination by the oppressive Power, that is 
by the refusal of the latter State, backed up by armed force, or even 
coercive measures short of military violence, to grant self-
determination to colonial peoples (or to peoples subjected to foreign 
military occupation or to organised racial groups denied equal access 
to government).  Furthermore, the world community did not go to the 
lengths of conferring a legal right proper on liberation movements, but 
only granted a licence to use force… 
 
On the other hand, third states must refrain from assisting a state that 
forcibly opposes self-determination.  Any substantial help to the 
oppressive state, be it military or economic in nature, is regarded as 
illegal under current international law.”17
 
These developments are reflected in two key UN resolutions:   
 
(a) The 1970 UN General Assembly Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations (Resolution 2625); and 
 
(b) The 1974 UN General Assembly Definition of Aggression 
(Resolution 3314). 
 
They are also reflected in the UN International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.18   
Notwithstanding the status of the self-determination principle, however, 
the counter terrorist strategy deployed by many States since 9/11 has had a 
profoundly corrosive affect upon the operation of the principle of self-
determination and, by implication, the international community’s commitment 
to support groups struggling for democracy against oppressive regimes. It has 
17 As above p 200. 
18 UN International Law Commission’s Draft: Responsibility of State for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001. 
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certainly brought into sharp relief the international community’s historically 
schizophrenic attitude towards the principle of self-determination and its deep 
distrust about its further application. As we know, there has always been an 
uneasy relationship between the principle of self-determination and the 
phenomenon of terrorism. There is a discernible tension between calls for a 
wider concept of terrorism and how that interplays with the recognition of the 
principle of self-determination, involving as it does a potential license to 
deploy force as a last resort in defence against an oppressive regime.  
It is this tension that lay at the heart of the international community’s 
inability to come to an agreed consensus about what constitutes terrorism 
before 9/11. It is why the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, 
established by the UN General Assembly to find a unanimously acceptable 
definition of terrorism, and which met from 1972 to 1979, was singularly 
unable to reach a consensus on a definition of the term terrorism. On the one 
hand many former colonised states were adamant that the legitimate actions of 
national liberation movements should not be confused with terrorism. On the 
other hand, many other states were deeply suspicious of extending the 
principle to situations unrelated to the decolonisation process. Such suspicion 
only increased after decolonisation. Thus, despite self-determination being 
recognised in UN treaties and attaining the status of a peremptory norm in 
international law there has been a concerted and consistent attempt to limit its 
external application.19  
It is for this reason that certain commentators argue that the outsourcing of 
the definition of terrorism to nation states since 2001 is a particularly 
dangerous development given the backdrop of these states lack of respect of 
thee right to self-determination. Too many states have a vested interest in 
down playing the right or not legally protecting the right to self-determination 
- precisely because of their own concerns about their own minorities or 
indigenous peoples or those of their allies. 
 Underlying this entire approach is the desire to reinforce the supremacy 
of the nation state and its sovereignty at the expense of other principles of 
international law, which seek to limit such state authority. Far from seeking to 
protect the principle of self-determination or democracy, since 2001 member 
states have used the opportunity presented by the upsurge in terrorism to 
further relegate its practical effect. Time and again they have ignored these 
19 The ICJ has virtually denuded the right of practical effect by (1) equating the term 
“peoples” with the “government of a whole territory”; and (2) through (the “uti 
possidetis”) rule that the exercise of self-determination must not involve changes to 
existing frontiers except where relevant nation states’ consent. This conflated 
territorial constraint has effectively disenfranchised minority peoples in a majority in 
a province or part of a state from invoking the right of external self-determination. 
(One need only take a cursory glance at the Namibia Case to understand just how far 
the principle has been neutered). 
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rights preferring instead to define terrorism in its broadest sense thereby 
giving governments the widest possible discretion to prohibit groups 
suspected of falling within that broad definition. This is because the right of 
self-determination with its suggestion that peoples of a territory can determine 
by a free and genuine vote the political status of their homeland either through 
independence, autonomy or integration with another state – presents a very 
threat to the power and authority of the nation state.  
Over the last six years there has been a demonstrable effort on the part of 
numerous states to deny or give succour to any liberation or resistance 
movement who prey in aid of the principle of democracy or self-
determination in their purported fight against oppressive states. On the 
contrary, movements who seek to invoke the principle are now routinely 
criminalised through proscription. This has huge consequences for numerous 
struggles around the world and for those organisations involved in them, such 
as the Palestinian search for statehood. Thus, the continued failure of the 
international community to reach an agreed consensus about what constitutes 
terrorism assumes much greater importance than at any time before 
September 2001. 
 
THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY AND OR RESIST AN OPPRESSIVE 
REGIME 
 
This attitude towards self-determination is replicated by many States 
attitude towards those groups who seek to resist oppressive regimes in support 
of democratic change. Most domestic provisions concerning terrorism and 
proscription fail to recognise any right to resist, rebel, or take up arms as a last 
resort in support of democracy. 
This is particularly ironic given the international community’s 
commitment to the principle of democracy. Both the General Assembly and 
the UN Commission on Human Rights have described terrorism as aimed at 
the destruction of democracy or the destabilising of “legitimately constituted 
Governments” and “pluralistic civil society.” Other resolutions state that 
terrorism “poses a severe challenge to democracy, civil society and the rule of 
law.” The 2002 EU Framework Decision, the 2002 Inter-American 
Convention, and the Draft Comprehensive Convention are similarly based on 
the premise that terrorism jeopardises democracy. While the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights has consistently upheld the principles of 
democracy and pluralism as constituting the cornerstone of the Convention 
which all member states are obliged to adhere. 
Yet despite this political commitment to the principle of democracy most 
member states have singularly failed to incorporate that commitment into 
domestic definitions of terrorism. Although there is no entrenched legal right 
of democratic governance in international law it is clear that since the end of 
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the cold war this principle is evolving into such a right and that the 
international community has begun to take idea of democratic rights seriously. 
 
The Example of the United Kingdom 
 
A paradigm example of state failure to fully incorporate recognition of the 
right of self-determination and or a right to democracy in its definition is the 
UK and its enactment of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA). Section 1(1) of the 
Terrorism Act defines terrorism as the use or threat of action falling within 
section 1(2) which is designed to influence the government or to intimidate 
the public or a section of the public for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause.  It has been held by the Court of Appeal that 
the word “government’ in s1(1)(b), as explained in s1(4)(d) in relation to 
foreign governments, is not limited to those countries which are governed by 
what may broadly be described as democratic or representative principles but 
includes a dictatorship, or a military junta or a usurping or invading power. 
Notwithstanding the European Convention’s commitment to democracy the 
Court ruled that s1 did not specify that the ambit of its protection is limited to 
countries abroad with governments of any particular type. What was striking 
about the language ofs1, read as a whole, “is its breadth.” 20
The action specified in section 1(2) is action which (a) involves serious 
violence against a person (b) involves serious damage to property (c) 
endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action 
(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the 
public, or (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system. The use of an action falling within section 1(2) which 
involves firearms or explosives, and which is carried out for a political, 
religious or ideological cause, is terrorism, whether or not it is designed to 
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public: 
section 1(3).  Thus, the use of any firearm for a political purpose in a manner 
which endangers a person’s life is terrorism.  And the disruption of any 
electronic system for a political purpose is terrorism, whether or not it is done 
by violent means. Section 1(4) makes it clear that the action may be an action 
which takes place outside the United Kingdom, and the government whose 
actions it is sought to influence may be a foreign government. 
The definition adopted in the TA is broader than that adopted in the 
International Convention (ICSTF).  In particular: 
 
(a) The ICSTF definition is confined to the use of violence on 
civilians and non-combatants. 
20 See Court of Appeal Judgment dated 16/02/07 in R v F. Case No: 2007/00579/B5. 
[2007] EWCA Crim 243. 
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(b) It does not include damage to property (other than by bombing). 
(c) It does not extend to action which creates a serious risk to health 
or safety. 
(d) It does not include the non-violent disruption of an electronic 
system. 
 
It follows that the potential range of foreign organisations falling within 
the definition of terrorism under the TA 2000 is extremely wide.  It potentially 
encompasses almost all organisations engaged in armed conflict around the 
world, whatever the circumstances, and is wide enough to include 
organisations which have the political support of the United Kingdom and 
which would, for that reason alone, not be proscribed (such as the Northern 
Alliance in Afghanistan).   
The power of proscription under section 3 is, however, discretionary.  The 
Secretary of State is not required to proscribe any organisation merely 
because it meets the statutory test.  The judgment which the Secretary of State 
is called upon to make is an essentially political one but one guided by 
principle, fairness and a proper examination of the surrounding context.  It is 
plain that the definition of terrorism in section 1 was intentionally overbroad, 
so as to delegate to the Secretary of State the judgment as to which 
organisations would, and which would not, be proscribed.  
In fact it is noteworthy that the scope of the Secretary of State’s discretion 
is further enlarged by the criteria for proscription.  Section 3(3) of the TA 
provides that the Secretary of State may exercise his power to add an 
organisation to the list of proscribed organisations in Schedule 2 “if he 
believes that it is concerned in terrorism.” Section 3(5) provides that an 
organisation is “concerned” in terrorism if it (a) commits or participates in 
acts of terrorism, (b) prepares for terrorism (c) promotes or encourages 
terrorism or (d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism. 
At first sight, it may appear that the Secretary of State must believe that 
the organisation is engaged, directly or indirectly, in acts of terrorism as 
defined in section 1 at the time he proscribes it, or at the very least that it is, at 
the relevant time, preparing for such acts or promoting or encouraging such 
acts by others.  This appears to be the natural reading of section 3(3) which 
uses the present tense (“…is concerned in…”).  However, section 3(5)(d) 
establishes an even broader basis for proscription.  Even where an 
organisation is not committing, participating or preparing for terrorism, nor 
encouraging or promoting such acts by others, it may be proscribed if the 
Secretary of State believes that it is “otherwise concerned” in terrorism.  As 
regards de-proscription, the Secretary of State interprets this to include a 
situation in which an organisation is not currently engaged in any of the 
prohibited forms of conduct, provided he believes or fears that it has engaged 
in acts of terrorism in the past, and may possibly do so again in the future. 
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This interpretation has recently been rejected by the Court of Appeal in the 
case of The Secretary of State for the Home Department and Lord Alton of 
Liverpool and others (Case No. 2007/9516). 
What is clear is the definition in the UK Terrorism Act 2000 is plainly 
capable of encompassing organisations that have engaged in lawful armed 
conflict in the exercise of the internationally recognised right to self-
determination of peoples.  As noted above, the United Kingdom is bound, in 
international law, to recognise that liberation movements representing certain 
peoples and organised racial groups have the right to engage in armed conflict 
in order to realise their legal right to self-determination.  And it is bound, in 
international law, to refrain from offering material support to states engaged 
in the suppression of the exercise of this right by military or other coercive 
means. However, the definition of terrorism in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 
is plainly wide enough to include such movements and organisations.  Those 
who support, or seek to elicit support for legitimate liberation movements, 
recognised as such under international law, are nonetheless at risk of 
proscription.  
The same is true for any organisation that claims to be resisting an 
oppressive regime and taking up arms as a last resort in an attempt to establish 
democratic change. However, as the Court of Appeal made clear in R v F 
(cited above) the Terrorism Act provides no cover in relation to those who 
take up arms against oppressive tyrannically regimes even as a legal defence 
rather than a claim. Take also, for example, the UK proscription of the PMOI, 
an Iranian resistance movement dedicated to the overthrow of the current 
regime in Tehran. The UK Secretary of State, in refusing the application to 
de-proscribe the PMOI, stated: 
 
“ The Home Secretary has taken full account of the …assertion that 
Mujahedin e Khalq is involved in a legitimate struggle against a 
repressive regime and has no choice but to resort to armed resistance. 
He notes too the claim that armed resistance is concentrated against 
military and security targets within Iran only. The Home Secretary 
does not, accept, however, any right to resort to acts of terrorism, 
whatever the motivation…”21
 
The reference to acts of terrorism means any use of force. It is simply 
impermissible for any movement to deploy force against another State in any 
circumstances including those provided for under international law. One 
might have reminded the Home Secretary of the preamble to the Universal 
21 Right to resist oppressive regimes must be recognised in terrorism legislation. – M 
Muller – http://mujahedin-e-khalq.org/MEK-MKO/ 
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Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (and its recognition of the rebellion as a 
last resort) that: 
 
“It is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights 
should be protected by the rule of law.” 
 
Yet, the proscription of the PMOI continues despite Former Prime 
Minister Blair’s recent admission on 8 February 2005 that Iran “certainly does 
sponsor terrorism” and is a deeply repressive regime. Again, it matters not 
whether this is or is not in fact an accurate description of the Iranian regime. 
What is striking is the UK Government’s desire to proscribe an organisation 
that does not have as its target any UK interests, and which, in the words of 
Mr. Blair, is fighting a state sponsor of terrorism. The important point is not 
whether the UK Government was right to proscribe this particular 
organisation but its apparent determination to impose a total prohibition on 
the use of violence whatever the circumstances and however dire the 
oppression of the group taking up resistance. Given the potential breadth of 
the Home Secretary’s discretion to proscribe surely one aspect of the exercise 
of this discretion is to have due regard for the principles of international law 
including the general principles of community law when deciding to proscribe 
an organisation that falls within the statutory criteria. Thus, even if the 
definition of terrorism under UK law is broad enough to encompass all 
organisations that deploy or threaten to deploy violence, the Home Secretary’s 
discretion is likewise broad enough to make exceptions based upon 
compliance with international obligations. 
 
PROSCRIPTION REGIMES AND THE REINFORCEMENT OF 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
So why do democratic governments such as the UK Government feel it 
politically necessary to not just define but also strictly apply the definition of 
terrorism in such a way as to jettison any commitment to democracy or self-
determination or make any allowance for those foreign movements fighting 
undemocratic or oppressive regimes or who were engaged in lawful armed 
conflict in the exercise of the internationally recognised right of the self 
determination of peoples? Especially in circumstances where the UK 
routinely expresses its support for the principle of democracy and is bound by 
international law to recognise the right and to refrain from offering material 
support to states engaged in the suppression of the exercise of the right by 
military or other coercive means. 
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Why, for example, in March 2001 did the UK Government feel compelled 
to proscribe 21 organisations together in a “take it or leave it list” without 
providing parliament with an opportunity to properly consider the individual 
merits in respect of each group or examine the distinction between terrorist, 
separatist, resistance, and liberation movements? After all, the UK Terrorism 
Act 2000 prefigured 9/11 and the subsequent global rise of Islamic 
fundamentalist insurgency. The 2000 Act was not rushed through parliament 
as a consequence of any state of emergency. Nor was it was enacted due to 
massive heightened public anxiety over terrorism. In fact the Terrorism Act 
came into force a full six months before 9/11 even occurred. 
Some argue that the enactments like the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 form 
part of a politicised process that preceded 9/11 in which many states had 
effectively resolved between themselves to reinforce the supremacy of state 
sovereignty at the expense of international law. These states were already 
increasingly co-operating with each other on a bilateral and sometime multi 
lateral basis to stop each other’s territory from being used by foreign 
resistance movements, irrespective of whether such movements could be said 
to be terrorist in nature or merely legitimately defending themselves against 
attack by an oppressive or racist regime. In short, these states effectively 
failed to protect the principles of self-determination and democracy within 
their domestic definitions of “terrorism” as both principles constitute a threat 
to the power and authority of the nation state and interfered with their 
respective foreign policies. 
That is why many legal commentators have argued that whether a group is 
on or off a proscription list has more to do with geo politics and diplomatic 
relations between states than with genuine threats to a particular countries 
national security and the strict application of law in relation to terrorism. The 
UN stricture to member states to co-operate in countering terrorism in practice 
has become intertwined with a whole set of other foreign, military and 
strategic objectives that govern relations between states. The temptation to 
offset any strict application of the law relating to fighting counter terrorism in 
favour of achieving other desirable foreign policy goals is huge. This 
temptation fundamentally affects the integrity of counter terror legislation and 
creates real resentment and further resistance within dissident groups who are 
caught by measures taken on broader policy grounds.  
Classic examples include the PMOI, which according to official papers 
was only proscribed by the Clinton Administration and later by the EU as a 
“good will gesture” towards Iran when the U.S. was seeking to court the 
newly elected moderate President Khatami. The European Council’s decision 
to proscribe the PMOI was subsequently challenged in the European Court of 
Justice. In early 2006 the Court of First Instance declared the original 
proscription unlawful holding that the Council had breached the applicant’s 
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procedural rights to a fair hearing and had wholly failed to provide reasons for 
the proscription.22  
Back in the UK a group of prominent Lords and Members of Parliament 
challenged the failure of the Home Secretary to de-proscribe the PMOI on the 
grounds that it breached fundamental rights and was politically motivated. 
The application for de-proscription was filed in June 2006. By that time the 
PMOI had given up its armed struggle for five years, voluntary disarmed its 
cadres in Iraq, and publicly pledged itself to overthrowing the regime in 
Tehran through peaceful non-violent means. On 30th November 2007, the 
Proscribed Organisation Appeals Commission (POAC) gave judgment and 
declared the proscription unlawful, characterising the position of the Home 
Secretary as legally “perverse”.23  
In April 2008 the Court of Appeal emphatically upheld that ruling. The 
Court referred to a two-stage test. The first test concerned whether the PMOI 
met the statutory provision of being “otherwise concerned in terrorism” under 
s 3(5)(d). The second test concerned whether, having come within the 
statutory provision, the Home Secretary lawfully exercised his discretion to 
proscribe or refuse to de-proscribe the PMOI. Both tests required an intense 
scrutiny of the Home Secretary’s belief that the PMOI was “otherwise 
concerned in terrorism” because proscription interfered with fundamental 
human rights. In the event, the Court of Appeal upheld POAC’s findings as to 
the nature of the scrutiny to apply and as to its the rulings of fact and law. In 
particular, it specifically rebutted the Home Secretary’s submission 
concerning the ambit of Section 3(50(d) that it was enough for an organisation 
to be “otherwise concerned in terrorism” even if it was not currently engaged 
in promoting, preparing or committing acts of terror, provided it maintained 
its organisational existence and the Home Secretary entertained a fear that it 
might use its resources to return to violence in certain unspecified 
circumstances. In fact what needed to be legally and evidentially 
demonstrated was that the PMOI was currently engaged in terrorism and/or 
continued to maintain its organisation for that specific intended purpose. 
There was no evidence to this effect and nothing less would do.24
Another example of a less than perfect legal proscription process concerns 
the original EU proscription of the PKK25, a radical Kurdish nationalist party 
22 See Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran v Council 
[2006] ECR II – 4665. 
23 See POAC Judgment of 30/11/07 in Lord Alton of Liverpool & Others (in the 
Matter of the People’s Mojahadeen Organisation of Iran) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department. Appeal No: PC/02/2006 
24 See Times Law Report, 13/05/08 – Court of Appeal Judgment dated 07/05/08 in 
Secretary of State for Home Department v Lord Alton and Others. Case no: 
2007/9516. 
25 Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan. 
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advocating greater rights for Kurds in Turkey. That organisation found itself 
proscribed by the EU after repeated requests from Turkey despite having 
observed a six-year cease-fire during which no acts of violence occurred. In 
fact the European Council failed to proscribe the PKK in its first proscription 
list of November 2001 issued just after 9/11 despite having conducted a 
thorough review of all organisations potentially caught by EU terror 
provisions. Six months later the European Council proscribed the PKK but 
only after it had announced its own dissolution and created a successor 
organisation KADEK, whose alleged purpose was to foster a democratic 
settlement to the Kurdish Question. Yet quite remarkably the Council failed to 
proscribe the successor organisation despite regarding KADEK as an alias of 
the PKK. When the Council did subsequently proscribe the successor 
organisations KADEK and Kongra-Gel as an alias of the PKK in 2004 it 
provided no reason for doing so whatsoever.  
Many observers find it hard to understand the legal logic of this 
proscription process. No reasons were ever provided to justify any of these 
decisions at all. More significantly, there was no explanation as to why, even 
if the PKK technically came within EU terror provisions, the Council found it 
legally necessary to exercise its discretion to ban such an organisation at a 
time when it had given up armed conflict and was ostensibly in search of a 
non-violent solution. By 2004 the PKK had been on cease-fire for some six 
years. Some observers suggest the process had more to do with international 
politics and the need to appease Turkey than with the strict application of law. 
Apart from the UK, many EU countries initially appeared reluctant to act 
against the PKK precisely because it was on cease-fire. This state of affairs 
had substantially assisted the EU accession and reform process within Turkey. 
Observers suggest this was why the PKK was not banned in November 2001 
and only banned in April 2002 after it had dissolved itself and had created a 
successor organisation.  
The PKK subsequently returned to the use of violence after its offer of a 
non-violent settlement was rejected by Turkey and all of its allied and so 
called “democratic” successor organisations, like Kongra-Gel, were 
proscribed by the European Union in 2004. Just whether the proscription 
regime deployed by the EU actually helped rather than hindered the 
international fight against terrorism remains a matter of real debate. The 
recent European Court of Justice’s ruling of March 2008 annulling both the 
original and 2004 proscriptions of the PKK26 and Kongra-Gel for breach of 
procedural rights and a failure to state reasons by the Council of the European 
 
 
26 See Case T-229/02 PKK and KNK v Council of the European Community – 
Judgment of 15/02/05 of the European Court of Justice and 03/04/08 of the Court of 
First Instance of the European Communities.  
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Union merely exacerbates this debate.27 What is clear is that the lack of 
procedural and substantive rights afforded to these organisations by the 
Council of the European Union hardly engendered within those organisations 
a respect for the rule of law or an acceptance that de-proscription procedures 
will be applied neutrally and fairly. If anything the manner by which the 
proscription regime was deployed merely fuelled the PKK’s eventual return to 
violence as all avenues for dialogue were closed. 
Thus, to many, the circumstances of the PMOI proscriptions and other EU 
proscriptions, like the original PKK decision, often appear to have less to do 
with the strict application of anti-terror provisions and more to do with the 
need of certain states to get other states to root out unwanted exiled dissident 
groups. In this process proscribing organisations appear to be traded between 
states like carbon trading emissions quotas. Thus, in order for certain states to 
secure certain foreign policy goals, and/or the co-operation of other states in 
their own fight against indigenous opposition movements, it became 
necessary to ensure the widest degree of legal latitude and discretion when it 
came to the business of proscription. That is why little attempt is made by 
Western powers to protect the right of self-determination or to ensure a right 
to democracy in terror legislation, despite their own avowed political support 
for the principle of democracy. Yet, while it might be necessary in terms of 
“real politic” for western states to afford to themselves a wide legal discretion 
when deciding to proscribe an organisation or not, there should be no illusion 
about how the infusion of politics into law by this process has degraded the 
legal integrity of a number of proscription regimes and actively hindered the 
ability of third parties and the international community to resolve certain 
conflicts through peaceful means.  
 
PROSCRIPTION REGIMES AND THE FAILURE TO DEFINE 
TERRORISM INTERNATIONALLY  
 
We know from bitter experience that how we label each other has a 
significant impact upon how we treat each other not just legally but also 
socially and politically. From US Senator McCarthy’s anti-communist list in 
the 1950’s onwards, we have seen time and again just how dramatic and 
draconian the consequences can be for a person or a group once they becomes 
designated on a proscribed list. These lists are not just designed to combat 
criminality. They are designed to de-legitimise certain organisations and their 
attendant struggles. Proscription regimes are not simply legal tools against 
27 See Case T-253/04 Judgment of 03/04/08 the Court of First Instance of Instance of 
the European Communities in Kongra-Gel and Others v Council of the European 
Union, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Intervener. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
129 
                                                     
terror but ideological and political ones as well. They communicate societies 
disfavour on the most profound scale. 
Accordingly, no one should be in the slightest doubt as to the legal, 
political and cultural significance of the development of comprehensive 
proscription “terror lists” in the wake of 9/11. The consequences of 
proscription are profound and far-reaching. Whether it is the USA Patriot 
Act28 or the EU Common Position on Combating Terrorism29 or the UK 
Terrorism Act 2000,30 all use proscription terror lists as a condition precedent 
to invoking a regime of offences designed to stifle a group’s ability to 
organise, meet and communicate. The purpose of the proscription lists are 
clear - it is to ostracise, censor, criminalise and silence all those groups that 
unfortunately find themselves on the list or who are associated with groups or 
persons on the list. 
In conclusion, the failure to agree an international definition of terrorism 
has had a particularly dangerous impact in field of domestic proscription 
regimes, the preferred method of combating terrorism around the world. The 
illegitimate or legally botched use of these proscription procedures is 
dangerous as it breeds long-term resentment among many exiled dissident 
groups and communities. The issue is not even whether on the relative merits 
any of the above named organisations deserve to be legally proscribed. It is 
the failure of Western states when deciding to proscribe an organisation or not 
to adhere to fair proscription procedures that are accessible, transparent and 
apply proportionate legal criteria that have due regard to international law and 
the protection of fundamental freedoms. The fact that Western States no 
longer accept that there are any circumstances where a group or unrecognised 
28 The USA response to 9/11 and the UN Security Resolutions is to be found in the 
USA Patriot Act (United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act) which was followed on 24 
September 2001 by Presidential Executive Order (No. 13224) entitled “Presidential 
Order Blocking Transactions with Terrorists, which proscribed 100 persons and 
entities suspected of being connected with terrorism.” 
29 The EU response to UNSC Resolution 1373 is to be found in Common Positions of 
27 December 2001, 2001/930/CFSP on combating terrorism, and 2001/931/CFSP on 
the application of specific measures to combat terrorism ([2001] OJ L 344/90), 
followed by the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002, which includes a 
definition of terrorism ([2002] OJ L 164/3), the Framework Decision on the European 
Arrest Warrant ([2002] OJ L 190/1), and other measures designed to freeze assets 
through the blacklisting suspected terror groups or persons. [In the EU proscription, 
although more symbolic, leads to the potential freezing of assets, and gives a powerful 
nod to member states to domestically proscribe the relevant organisation or person]. 
30 The UK’s relevant anti-terror legislation is to be found in the Terrorism Act 2000, 
which provides for the proscription of terrorist organisations. On 29 March 2001 
Parliament passed an Order formally proscribing 21 organisations in a take all of it or 
live it list. 
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people might be forced to have to violence in support of a political objective 
protected by international law has huge implications for global security and 
conflict resolution.  
 
A DANGEROUS INTERNATIONAL LACUNA 
 
Why does all this matter? It matters because, more often than not, the 
source of violence around the world occurs where there is no democratic 
outlet for dissent or credible protection for persecuted peoples and minorities. 
A dangerous political and human rights lacuna has been created in the 
international legal system. This lacuna consists of the international 
communities failure to address the position of stateless nations, peoples, and 
persecuted minorities, and those involved in the collective fight for 
democratic reform against authoritarian regimes. Instead, member states 
within the United Nations have preferred to reinforce the virtual inviolability 
of the system of state sovereignty, save in the exceptional circumstances 
where the Security Council authorises use of force under Chapter Seven. This 
lacuna has led to numerous internal conflicts which could have been avoided 
had certain avenues of international political and legal redress been available. 
The failure to provide avenues of redress has led numerous groups to turn to 
more violent methods. The recent swathe of domestic terror legislation simply 
entrenches this process through its failure to distinguish between terrorism 
and true resistance in support of democratic change. The attempt to secure 
international harmony and cooperation through the enforcement of the 
supremacy of state sovereignty at all costs merely creates more adherents to 
non-peaceful strategies as dissident groups feel disenfranchised and unfairly 
punished. 
As noted above, the root cause of this remains the continued failure of the 
international community to reach any agreed consensus about what constitutes 
terrorism and the outsourcing of the definition of terrorism to member states. 
As Helena Kennedy QC, the former Chair of the British Council, perceptibly 
notes: 
 
“Until there is an internationally recognised and sufficiently restrictive 
definition, it will be hard to have confidence that struggles for self-
determination and other political activities will not be wrapped up in 
accusations of ‘terrorism’.”31
 
31 Suspect Communities: The Real “War on Terror” in Europe (London Metropolitan 
University) 
http://www.ejdm.de/Suspect%20Communitites%20Conference%20Report.pdf 
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Kennedy is surely right when she warns of the danger of “the passing of 
anti-terrorist legislation against the backdrop of principle.”  
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has expressed concern 
about the legislative measures taken by some countries and urged states to 
ensure that measures undertaken pursuant to resolution 1373 comply with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. More recently, the 
Council of Europe issued Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers on Human 
Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism32 stating that it is “absolutely 
necessary, to fight terrorism while respecting human rights, the rule of law 
and, where applicable, international law.” In fact member states of the EU 
would be wise to recall that the EU note accompanying the draft of the 
European Framework decision circulated after 11 September 2001 stated that 
the definition of terrorism does not include “those who have acted in the 
interests of preserving or restoring democratic values.” The Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly 2008 Report and Resolution on the use of terror lists 
prepared by its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (CLAHR), 
written by Senator Dick Marty, rightly criticised the failure of EU and its 
states to adhere to principles of legal fairness and international law when 
enforcing proscription regimes.33
In short terror lists should not used as mere instruments of foreign policy 
without a proper regard for the principles of due process and rights recognised 
in both of national and international law. Certain persecuted groups allegedly 
forced to take up violence as a last resort must be given an avenue of redress 
or at the least, the possibility of raising a legal defence, both procedurally and 
substantively, to a charge of terrorism, so that any further resort to violence 
can be rightly condemned as extremist and unlawful by all right thinking 
nations. Otherwise the application of proscription regimes will hinder rather 
than help the fight against terrorism and the wider search for peace across the 
globe. 
32 Appendix 3 to the Decisions of the Committee of Ministers, adopted at their 80th 
meeting on 11 July 2002 CM/Del/Dec (2002) 804 of 15 July 2002, 
http://wcm.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=296009&lang=en. 
33 See Committee on legal Affairs Document 11454 and the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1597 (2008) on United Nations Security Council 
and European Union Blacklists. 
